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he issue of the adequacy of 
compensation for workers who are 
disabled by their employment generates 
great controversy. State-regulated 
workers' compensation programs provide 
wage replacement (or "wage-loss") 
benefits to workers while off work due to 
a work-related disability, as well as 
medical treatment and rehabilitation 
services to assist such workers in 
returning to work. Since employers 
apparently pay the costs of workers' 
compensation programs and workers 
apparently derive the benefits, the 
situation is ripe for misunderstanding and 
hyperbole. 1 Nevertheless, policymakers 
must make such judgments when they set 
benefit schedules under workers' 
compensation statutes.
Wage-loss benefits are usually stated 
as a percentage of the worker's previous 
weekly earnings; typically two-thirds of 
gross wages or 80 percent of net (take- 
home) pay. 2 The latter formula has arisen 
to ensure that injured workers are not 
"overcompensated" for lost wages when 
viewed from an after-tax perspective, 
since workers' compensation benefits are 
free of all income and payroll taxes.
What is Benefit Adequacy?
Unfortunately, there is no universally 
accepted definition of benefit adequacy. 
The National Commission on State 
Workmen's Compensation Laws 
recommended 30 years ago that states 
provide at least two-thirds wage 
replacement up to a maximum of 200 
percent of the state average weekly wage. 
This standard was subsequently adopted 
by the Council of State Governments in 
1974 when they amended their "Model 
Act for Workmen's Compensation." 
Because this represents the closest thing 
we have to an accepted adequacy 
standard, and because 35 states actually 
use two-thirds of gross wages as their 
replacement formula, the Sub-committee 
on Benefit Adequacy of the Workers' 
Compensation Steering Committee at the 
National Academy of Social Insurance 
(NASI) has also been using this standard 
in its review of benefit adequacy (see 
www.nasi.org for more details). Given 
these precedents, I will also adopt two- 
thirds of gross wages as the measure of 
adequacy.
What Does the Research Say?
Recently, three separate empirical 
studies carefully explored the level of
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workers' compensation wage-loss 
replacement in the states of California, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. Both the 
Washington and Wisconsin studies 
estimated losses for the full range of 
injured workers, while the California 
study included only workers with 
permanent partial disability benefits. All 
the studies used administrative data on 
actual earnings of individuals who were 
not injured, or not seriously injured, to 
estimate the wages that workers' 
compensation claimants would have 
earned in the absence of the disability.
In a recent volume published by the 
Upjohn Institute for NASI, the three 
primary authors of these state-specific 
studies derived comparable estimates of 
the losses suffered and compensation 
received for permanent partial disability 
(PPD) claimants in the three states (see 
Budetti et al. 2001). While this analysis is 
not as broad as the earlier ones (at least 
for Washington and Wisconsin), it does 
cover a very interesting workers' 
compensation subpopulation that 
accounts for about 60 percent of all 
benefit payments and includes many of 
the most contentious cases in the workers' 
compensation programs. It is also the 
group of cases which raise the most 
significant questions about benefit 
adequacy because of the likely 
permanency of wage losses.
Workers' compensation benefits in 
these studies are defined to include both 
temporary and permanent wage-loss 
benefits, cash settlements (which can 
include payments for future medical 
benefits in California and Wisconsin), and 
vocational rehabilitation maintenance 
allowance. For this comparison, the 
authors chose to ignore the effects of 
taxation, so results are presented in pretax 
dollars. Injured workers are compared to 
noninjured workers of similar preinjury 
wage levels employed at similar (or the 
same) firms. Using the wages of similar 
uninjured workers standardizes the 
comparison for unemployment, inflation, 
job promotions, and other labor market 
changes.
Benefits paid and wages lost are 
measured for at least 3.5 years after the
point of injury. They are projected 
beyond the observed 3.5 years by carrying 
the final observed year's losses and 
benefits forward for an additional 6.5 
years and discounting all amounts back to 
the point of observation. It is worth 
noting that attorney fees and other 
potential medical/legal costs have not 
been deducted from the gross benefits 
paid, nor have any lost fringe benefits 
been counted as economic losses. 3
Wage-loss replacement 
adequacy seems to be better for
low-wage workers, for
employees at smaller, insured
firms, for more severely disabled
workers, and in certain states.
Table 1 shows the total wage-loss 
benefits paid in the first 3.5 years 
following the injury, the estimated wage 
losses for the first 3.5 years, projected 
losses for the 10 years following the 
injury, and the estimated wage-loss 
replacement rate for 10 years in 
California, Wisconsin, and Washington.
Despite some differences among the 
states in the method of compensating PPD 
cases (although all three use disability 
ratings), the replacement rates for 10-year 
losses are quite similar and remarkably 
low. Workers' compensation programs 
replace about 38 percent of lost earnings 
for injured workers with permanent
partial disabilities in California and 46 
percent in Washington and Wisconsin (see 
Biddle, Boden, and Reville 2001, p. 276). 
After-tax replacement rates would be 
higher, since workers' compensation 
benefits are free of income tax. However, 
it is clear that gross wage replacement 
rates fall well below the two-thirds 
standard generally specified by statute, at 
least for this group of injured workers 
with permanent partial disabilities.
Differences by Disability Rating
A major policy issue is benefit 
adequacy as a function of the degree of 
disability. Presumably, more seriously 
disabled workers are less likely to 
eventually return to work and therefore 
more likely to be dependent upon 
workers' compensation or other social 
insurance benefits.4 Table 2 reports 
projected losses for 10 years following 
injury and 10-year replacement rates for 
workers' compensation claimants 
according to their disability rating in the 
three states. The disability rating is a 
rough attempt to quantify the degree to 
which an individual is disabled. It 
estimates the percentage of impairment to 
the "whole man." This is the most 
common way of setting compensation for 
permanent disabilities among U.S. 
jurisdictions (Barth and Niss 1999).
Since permanent partial disability 
benefits are largely determined by the 
disability rating, rather than vice versa, 
we are looking for confirmation that
Table 1
Average Losses and Pretax Replacement Rate for Permanent Partial 


























aAll dollar values measured in constant (1984) dollars.
bProjected, assuming wage-losses and benefit payments continue at same rate as in final observed 
year. 
SOURCE: Biddle, Boden, and Reville (2001), p. 276.
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Table 2
The Relationship of Losses and Income Benefits 
by Disability Rating
Permanent disability rating
21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100
California 1993 injuries
Losses projected 10 yr. ($) 
10-yr. replacement rate (%)
Washington 1993-94 injuries
Losses projected 10 yr. ($) 
10-yr. replacement rate (%)
Wisconsin 1989-90 injuries
Losses projected 10 yr. ($) 































NOTE: "Benefits" means temporary plus permanent disability benefits. 
SOURCE: Biddle, Boden, and Reville (2001), p. 281.
estimated wage losses increase regularly 
(proportionally?) with disability rating. 
Such a rinding would provide evidence 
that workers' compensation systems are 
at least getting the wage-loss replacement 
dollars to the right people.
The table shows that while 10-year 
losses increase steadily with disability 
rating, at least in California and 
Wisconsin, compensation more than 
keeps up, as wage-loss replacement rates 
rise with disability rating. This is very 
pronounced in California, with 
replacement rates rising from 7 percent 
for the least serious injuries to 54 percent 
for the most serious. Wisconsin shows a 
more gradual increase, from 40 percent 
replacement in the least serious to 58 
percent in the most serious injuries. In 
Washington, losses do not increase with 
disability rating, indicating that disability 
ratings are not well correlated with 
earnings losses.
Conclusions
These recent studies based upon 
administrative data and using carefully 
selected comparison groups improve our 
estimates of wage replacement adequacy 
in workers' compensation programs 
significantly. Research to date indicates
that wage-loss replacement adequacy 
seems to be better for low-wage workers, 
for employees at smaller, insured firms 
(which is likely the same thing), for more 
severely disabled workers, and in certain 
states.
However, very few of the before-tax 
replacement rates reported here even 
came close to the two-thirds standard of 
adequacy. Thus our conclusion must be 
that workers' compensation wage- 
replacement benefits are not adequate, at 
least for workers with permanent partial 
disabilities in these particular states. As 
usual, more research is needed to shed 
more light on these questions.
NOTES
1. We say "apparently" because labor market 
analysts believe that both costs and benefits can be 
shifted between workers and their employers by the 
market forces of labor supply and demand.
2. Actually 35 states maintain temporary total 
workers' compensation benefits at two-thirds of 
gross earnings, while 4 states use 80 percent of net, 
and 2 states are at 75 percent of net. Six states pay 
more than two-thirds of gross, two states pay less 
than two-thirds, and one state uses a variable 
replacement rate.
3. Of course, analyzing only permanent partial 
disabilities also biases the wage-loss result, since 
these cases are the most likely to be disputed and to 
result in compromise settlements. See Barm and 
Niss (1999).
4. See Barm and Niss (1999) for a description of 
the variety of PPD methods.
H. Allan Hunt is Assistant Executive Director at 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research.
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David I. Levine
E• j(Economists often assume markets 
set wages. On the contrary, for most 
Americans, employers set their wages 
within an internal labor market that is 
often only weakly associated with a spot 
market. A characterization of internal 
labor markets back in the 1960s and 
1970s might be that they provided an 
implicit employment contract that 
exchanged employees' hard work for 
employment security. For lack of a better 
term, we refer to that arrangement as the 
"old employment contract."
During the last decade, the media have 
proclaimed the death of the old 
employment contract and a new emphasis 
on flexibility and external, not internal, 
labor markets. In fact, this 
pronouncement is overstated, if not 
incorrect. As Samuel Clemens remarked 
upon seeing his obituary, "The news of 
my death is greatly exaggerated." Data 
do show that employment security may 
be tempered. However, while tenure is a 
bit shorter on average than it used to be, 
the declines are modest for most groups 
of workers.
While past research has emphasized 
the length of jobs as a measure of the 
strength of internal labor markets, it is 
also important to understand the evolution 
of complementary measures; the 
divergence of pay in the internal and 
external labor markets. In a forthcoming. 
Upjohn Institute book (Levine et al. 
2002), we present an exhaustive study 
using five distinct sources of data, 
including a unique data set with 
information on employers and employees 
in both the United States and Japan and a 
new survey on fairness in employment. 
We examined changes in internal labor 
markets, company pay structures, and the
employment contract. Our conclusion is 
that, as far as the wage setting process is 
concerned, there is very little confirmation 
of the existence of a "new employment 
contract."
The Old Contract
In the classic old employment contract, 
especially at large employers, wages were 
not strongly responsive to the labor 
market. Instead, each company had a 
distinctive company wage level and 
pattern. The implications of these patterns 
were as follows:
1. Large employers pay higher wages;
2. Large and small employers reward 
employee characteristics such as 
age and education differently;
3. Wage levels of large and small 
employers within a region are only 
weakly related;
4. Wage levels among large employers 
within a region have large and per 
sistent deviations from each other;
5. The pattern of pay differentials 
inside an internal labor market often 
differ from those in the external 
labor market;
6. Large employers hire higher-skilled 
employees and those from demo 
graphic groups managers preferred; 
and
7. Employees hold strong norms 
against almost any type of pay cuts.
Our study finds that these implications 
are supported in the data from the 1960s 
to the mid 1980s.
Have Institutions and Wage 
Structures Weakened?
The standard reading of recent 
business history suggests that the wage 
structures associated with internal labor 
markets (as described by Doeringer and 
Piore in their 1971 work) weakened 
between 1980 and 1996 (e.g., Cappelli 
1995). If internal labor markets have 
declined, we should be able to answer 
"yes" to all of the following questions. 
Our analyses did not find this 
confirmation.
1. Did wage levels at large and small 
employers become similar? Yes, 
but modestly. The wage gap paid 
apparently similar employees at 
large (over 1000 employees) and 
small employers (under 100 
employees) declined from 18 per 
cent in 1979 to 14 percent in 1993.
2. Did the returns on education and 
tenure in large and small employers 
converge? No.
3. Did the correlation between average 
wages in a local labor market and 
large company wages rise? No. In 
neither the Current Population Sur 
vey (covering 1979 to 1993) nor the 
Hay data set (1986 to 1992) did the 
correlation between average wages 
in a local labor market and large 
company wages rise.
4. Did inequality across employers 
decline? No. The standard devia 
tion of employer wage effects 
remained near 11 percent in both 
the Cleveland Salary Survey (CSS) 
and Hay data sets. In addition, the 
persistence of employer wage 
effects remained similar in the 
1990s as in the early 1980s (CSS).
5. Did the distinctiveness of wage pat 
terns within an employer decline? 
No. Among large employers, the 
variability and persistence of dis 
tinctive internal wage structures 
remained constant from the early 
1980s to the 1990s (CSS). Simi 
larly, the differentials large firms 
paid for more education, age, and 
other worker characteristics did not
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come to resemble the differentials 
that small firms paid.
6. Did sorting of employees decline? 
Unclear. In the Hay dataset, sorting 
of skills was similar in 1986 and 
1992. In the Current Population 
Survey, with the exception of race, 
differences in the characteristics of 
employees at large and small 
employers either remained constant 
or converged substantially between 
1979 and 1993. In the CSS, the 
correlation between an employers' 
average wage (conditional on its 
occupation mix) and the mean wage 
of entry-level occupations rose by 
an economically meaningful 
amount.
7. Have attitudes changed to be more 
accepting of the vagaries of the 
market? No. Our study repeated 
questions about the fairness of pay 
cuts that were asked in a Canadian 
study in Vancouver and Toronto in 
the mid 1980s (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). When 
we surveyed workers in those two 
Canadian cities as well as in Silicon 
Valley in the United States in 1997 
and 1998, the acceptability of a pay 
cut was almost identical.
Implications for Theory
Our results are surprisingly 
unsupportive of any single story about 
changes in wage structures at large U.S. 
employers. Human capital theorists posit 
a tight relationship between skills and 
wages. Consistent with the hypothesis 
that returns to human capital have risen, 
returns to measures of skill such as 
education, tenure, mean occupational 
education, and Hay points rose in the 
1980s and 1990s.
Nevertheless, most of our results are 
inconsistent with human capital 
explanations for wage differentials among 
employers (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
1993; Davis and Haltiwanger 1991). In 
the early period, controlling for skills did 
not systematically reduce the estimated 
wage gap between high- and low-wage 
employers (Hay, CSS, U.S.A./Japan). 
Moreover, controlling for measures of 
skills did little more (CSS) or nothing
more (Hay) to undo the rising inequality 
among employers. High-wage employers 
remain high-wage employers even with 
very detailed controls. These results 
challenge all theories of wage 
determination.
An important question motivating our 
work was whether rising wage inequality 
is related to weakening internal labor 
markets. Studies using longitudinal data 
on individuals conclude that rising 
inequality appears to be due to job 
changes, not to rising pay variance within 
a career at a single employer (Gottschalk 
and Moffit 1994). Our study did not 
examine longitudinal data sources, but 
consistent with the past research, we 
found no increase in variability within 
employers' wage structures over time, 
implying more is at risk when people 
change jobs.
As far as the wage setting
process is concerned, there
is very little confirmation
of the existence of a "new
employment contract."
Our findings of unchanged wage- 
setting rigidities (on average) pose a 
puzzle for institutional theories of these 
rigidities. Most of the rigidities 
(employer wage effects, size-wage 
effects, etc.) have historically been linked 
to unions and to product markets 
characterized by oligopolies, regulation, 
and limited international competition. 
The last quarter of the twentieth century 
witnessed a decline in all of these 
product-market rigidities, but without a 
corresponding decline in rigidities in 
compensation outcomes examined here. 
These findings suggest that fairness 
considerations and other micro-level 
determinants of bargaining power and the 
payoff to efficiency wages may play a 
relatively larger role in determining wage 
patterns and rigidities than many 
researchers previously thought.
Implications for Managers
The rhetoric of the new employment 
contract suggests that employers and
employees now accept external labor 
markets as the best way to organize 
employment. Our survey results show 
that employees' norms toward pay cuts 
and layoffs remain consistent with the 
traditional employment contract. 
Moreover, companies' pay policies, 
presumably in part reflecting this stability 
in norms, do not appear vastly more 
flexible or market-oriented than in years 
past.
For managers, our results suggest that 
traditional internal labor market policies 
such as minimizing layoffs may still be 
useful in promoting high levels of skill 
and effort. Moreover, When layoffs are 
necessary, employees accept them more if 
they are due to external causes such as 
low sales, if top executives share the pain, 
and if the firm provides notice and 
assistance.
Implications for Public Policy
Employment-related policies in the 
United States have often been linked to 
the old employment contract. For 
example, the United States is the only 
industrialized nation in which an 
employee's pension and health insurance 
depend on his or her current employment 
relationship. Training decisions after 
college are largely determined by a 
worker's current employer, with no 
visible means of certifying to future 
employers what was learned on the job. 
Affirmative action policies have 
emphasized increasing employment of 
underrepresented groups in large 
employers, based on the assumption that 
jobs at large employers have above- 
average career prospects. Unemployment 
insurance and protection from many other 
labor laws often do not apply to workers 
with short-term or nonstandard relations 
with their employer.
Does our argument that the new 
employment contract is not much 
different from the old contract imply that 
changes in employment-related policies 
are moot? Not at all. While mobility and 
flexibility have not shown marked 
increases, North American labor markets 
have always had high mobility. Thus, 
public policies based exclusively on the 
old model never fit the careers and lives of
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many Americans. For example, it never 
made sense for health insurance and 
pensions to have been based on a model 
of lifetime employment at a single firm. 
Instead, public policies should encourage 
portability of pensions and health 
insurance. Government connection to 
learning should never have stopped after 
college; instead, the government should 
oversee a system of industry-designed 
certifications for general skills.
At the same time, the results in our 
study imply that labor market policy 
should not abandon the focus on creating 
stable jobs. While few employers can 
assure lifetime employment, most 
employees still value the predictability 
and relationships that come from long- 
term employment.
David I. Levine is an associate professor at the 
Haas School of Business at the University of 
California, Berkeley.
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Temporary Employment in Auto Supply
George Erickcek and Susan Houseman 
at the W.E. Upjohn Institute, along with 
Arne Kalleberg of the University of North 
Carolina, are completing a case study on 
the use of temporary agency workers by 
auto suppliers in the Midwest. The 
research effort is part of a larger study 
being funded by the Russell Sage 
Foundation that also explores the use of 
flexible staffing arrangements in hospitals 
and public schools.
The nonunion plants in our study 
extensively used temporary agency 
employment to respond to short-term 
increases in production and to screen 
workers for permanent positions. 
Temporary help agencies enjoyed 
economies of scale in recruitment and 
screening. The use of temporary help 
employment to screen potential workers 
was especially attractive to manufacturers 
when labor markets were tight and many 
job applicants had marginal work 
histories. Because workers were 
employed by a temporary agency during 
the probationary period, the manufacturer 
was spared some of the financial and 
emotional costs associated with dismissal, 
when that became necessary.
The use of temporary agency workers 
also appeared to lower labor costs for low- 
skilled production activities. The agency 
fees charged for temporary workers were 
found to be lower than the full 
compensation package offered to new 
direct hires. By lowering dismissal and 
wage costs, temporary help agencies
facilitated employers' use of less- 
experienced and otherwise riskier 
workers, thereby minimizing employers' 
need to increase wages to attract 
experienced workers away from other 
companies. The latter strategy likely 
would have resulted in higher wages not 
only for new hires, but also for existing 
employees.
While the use of temporary agency 
workers can have a negative impact on 
productivity or the production error rate, 
several employers organized work 
stations to minimize such problems. 
Well-trained permanent workers 
routinely monitored the agency 
temporaries and helped avert production 
problems.
Although agency temporaries received 
lower wages and benefits than permanent 
workers, they were considered for 
permanent positions in all of the plants in 
our study. Moreover, because many of 
the agency temporaries lacked 
manufacturing experience or had poor 
work histories, temporary help agencies 
may have given these workers access to 
jobs that they otherwise would not have 
had. In general, we found that the use of 
temporary agency employment had little 
or no negative impact on the morale of 
permanent workers or the temporaries 
themselves. In one exception, resentment 
built when temporary workers believed 
that they were being kept in temporary 
status long after they had proven 
themselves to be qualified hires.
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